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EL3MhNATION OF THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE
PRINCIPLE: ANOTHER PATH THROUGH THE
MIDDLE WAY
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN*
"Yet it is clear that Hobbits had, in fact, lived quietly in Middle-earthfor
many long years before other folk became even aware of them."" 0

INTRODUCTION

T

RADITIONAL land use law categorizes governmental activities
that affect the value of private property as exercises of either the
state's police power or eminent domain power.1 This dichotomy has
created what Professor John J. Costonis describes as the "disparity
issue":2 if in a legitimate exercise of its police power a state reduces the
value of land, no compensation is required; 3 if the governmental action
devalues land too much, however, it is deemed a taking within the
eminent domain power and full compensation according to the land's
"highest and best use" is required. 4 Often, this compensation exceeds
*

Associate Professor of Law, Drake University.

** J. Tolkien,.The Fellowship of the Ring 21 (1965).

1. The leading articles on eminent domain include: Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis
for City Planning, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 650 (1958); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165
(1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax I],
revised in Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Sax II]. The Michelman article together with B. Ackerman, Private Property and the
Constitution (1977) assume a jurisprudential, rather than a pragmatic approach to property law.
See also D. Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law §§ 173-187, at 310-43
(1971); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 437-50 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as J. Nowak]; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 9-1 to -4, at 456-65
(1978); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 165 (1974);
Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1427, 1497-1501 (1978).
2. Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 402, 403 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DisparityIssue]; Costonis, "Fair"Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1021, 1033-49 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fair Compensation].
3. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning ordinances).
4. See e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490-92 (1973); Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973); United States v. Reynolds,
397 U.S. 14, 16-19 (1970). In addition, the different treatment of the issue by the states has
created a geographical disparity. Take, for example, a wetlands controversy in which a
landowner who desires to backfill and develop his land discovers that his state has passed
legislation prohibiting such activity. In one state this may be an exercise of the police power
which entities the landowner to no relief, see, e.g., Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239
(1975); State Dep't of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977);
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wisc. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), while in other states it may be
an exercise of eminent domain power which entities him to just compensation based upon the
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the land's present value. 5
Rather than attempting to solve the problem of when a governmental regulation or overregulation constitutes a taking, 6 Professor Costonis charts "a middle way" through this Scylla and Charybdis.7 He
posits that "for certain types of land use controversies .

.

.

the

financial burden of public intervention should fall neither solely upon
the landowner, as orthodox police power doctrine would have it, nor
upon government, as established eminent domain principles would
dictate." '8 As an example of this middle way, Professor Costonis points
to the recent decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York (Grand Central Terminal).9
To justify his middle way, Professor Costonis poses a series of
penetrating questions about the traditional dichotomized approach to
land use regulation. 10 This Article will address one of these questions:
"[W]hy must compensation be pegged to the prohibitively expensive
'highest and best use' level in cases of overregulation?"' It is submitted that in some cases the highest and best use principle is inappropriate. If some compensation can be justified when the state exercises its
police power, as in Grand Central Terminal, 12 then less than full
highest and best use of the land. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris
County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Pars.ppany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d
232 (1963).
5. See pt. II infra.
6. The extensive scholarship exploring this issue is as rich as it is irreconcilable. See, e.g.,
Michelman, supra note 1; Sax I, supra note 1; Sax II, supra note 1.
7. See Disparity Issue, supra note 2, at 406-09; FairCompensation, supra note 2, at 1049-82.
Professor Costonis suggests that attempts to solve the "taking" problem are doomed to failure.
Id. at 1021-23.
8. Disparity Issue, supra note 2, at 403.
9. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978),
discussed in Disparity Issue, supra note 2.
10. The questions posed are: "First, is it the case, a; the loose language of innumerable zoning
opinions implies, that overregulation is a 'taking,' hence remediable exclusively through eminent
domain proceedings? . . . Second, why must compensation be pegged to the prohibitively
expensive 'highest and best use' level in cases of overregulation? . . . Third, why must
compensation be paid in dollars when government, though often strapped for funds, is in a
position to offer various nondollar trade-offs of palpable economic value? Fourth, why must
government be constrained by eminent domain's burdensome procedural requirements when tile
effects of overregulation can be overcome in many cases by providing an appropriate compensatory offset in the regulatory program itself? Finally, should land's value in disparity disputes be
fixed independently of the landowner's identity or of government's contribution to the land's
profitability?" Disparity Issue, supra note 2, at 405-06 (footnote omitted).
11. Id. at 406. Professor Costonis continues this query as follows: "Is that standard really
necessary to insure fair treatment for the landowner? Isn't it absurd a half century after [Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)] to allow government to reduce land values
far below this level in the run-of-the-mine zoning case but to insist that, should government seek
to deal equitably with the landowner, nothing less than restoration of the land's value to its
highest and best use will do?" Disparity Issue, supra note 2, at 406.
12. See pt. I(B) infra.
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compensation may be appropriate when the state exercises its eminent
domain power.
L.

MODELS OF LAND USE DECISIONS

A decision as to whether a governmental action is a regulation or a
taking, though not the main concern, is a predicate to the issues
discussed herein. Resort to Holmes' enigmatic statement that an overregulation is a taking 13 is tempting, but should be avoided. Aside from
its circularity, the statement contains an implicit assumption that if a
governmental activity is categorized as a regulation, then by definition
no compensation is required. The obverse is also assumed: if a
governmental activity is defined as a taking, then compensation is
required. These assumptions are neither necessarily nor implicitly true,
and it is becoming clearer that land use decisions no longer fall into
4
traditional categories.'

A.

The Models Defined

Traditionally, land use decisions, as already mentioned, have been
compartmentalized into two basic models.'" Grand Central Terminal
16
provides a third model and the following analysis yields a fourth.
These models may be roughly defined as: (I) a governmental measure' 7
that falls within the police power and does not require any compensa13. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). One commentator has
rejected the Pennsylvania Coal rationale and thereby implicitly rejected the police powerleminent
domain dichotomy by proposing a "pure" due process standard, that is, due process "purged of
the notion that overly burdensome regulation constitutes a 'taking.' " Comment, Grand Central
Terminal and the New York Court of Appeals: "Pure" Due Process, Reasonable Return, and
Betterment Recovery, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 134, 142 (1978). Traditionally, this "pure" due process
has been called "substantive" due process. See id. at 142-8.
14. Land use theory is developing into predictable schools of thought. The "'police power
enthusiasts" are exemplified in Sax I, supra note 1, and in F. Bosselman. D. Callies & J. Banta,
The Taking Issue (1973). FairCompensation, supra note 2, at 1024-26. The "private marketeers"
include Bernard Siegan and Professor Ellickson. See id. at 1026-33 (discussing B. Siegen,
Planning Without Prices (1977) and Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385 (1977)).
15. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
16. The author acknowledges the dangers and pitfalls in attempting to avoid compartmentalization by creating new categories. See Breitel, A Judicial View of Transferable Development
Rights, 30 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest 5, 7 (No. 2. 1978) (criticizing the use of boxes); ef
Berger, The Accommodation Power In Land Use Controversies:A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76
Colum. L. Rev. 799, 815-23 (1976) (criticizing Professor Costonis' new categories). Nevertheless,
the limits of language force the creation of new categories for illustrative purposes, if for no other
reason. I am confident this will not yield a "fearful synmetxy." W. Blake. The Tyger, in Poems of
William Blake 60 (1974).
17. The word "measure" is used instead of "regulation" because the latter is often defined as
being within the police power.
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tion;1 8 (II) a governmental measure that falls within the police power
for which some, perhaps nondollar, compensation is given (Grand
Central Terminal); (III) a governmental measure that falls within the

eminent domain power for which some, but not full, compensation is
given (this Article); and (IV) a governmental measure that falls within
the eminent domain power and requires full compensation in accordance with the highest and best use principle. t 9
Models I and IV, the polarities, have been employed almost exclu21
20
and contradictory results.
sively and have led to indefensible
Models II and III, on the other hand, are accommodation models which

create a middle way by first abandoning total allegiance to the police
power/eminent domain dichotomy, and, second, by describing situa-

tions in which a governmental measure requires some, but not total,
compensation. The basic justification for the middle way is the cre-

ation of an ethical rather than a technical standard for compensation
law. 2 2 The differences and similarities among these models can be
readily ascertained when the models are arranged along a con2 3
tinuum.
VALUATION CONTINUUM

Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Police Power

Police Power

Eminent Domain

Eminent Domain

No Compensation

Some Compensation

Less than Full
Compensation

Full Compensation

Models II, III, and IV allow compensation, but base the allowance
on substantively different considerations. Models II and III require, at
all times, less than full compensation. Model III differs from Model II
18. See, e.g., Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Gorieb v. Fox,
274 U.S. 603 (1927); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490-92 (1973); Almota Farmers Elevator
& Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973); United States v. Reynolds, 397
U.S. 14, 16-19 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of all cedar trees, some of
which were parasite-infested, in order to save all apple trees).
21. Frequently, the same governmental action will be termed an exercise of police power by
one court and an exercise of eminent domain power by another court. See note 4 supra.
22. See generally B. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 100-89; FairCompensation, supra note 2, at
1021-23; Michelman, supra note 1, at 1214-24.
23. This continuum roughly corresponds with that of Professor Costonis, see FairCompensa.
tion, supra note 2, at 1050, but under Model III, compensation is not made according to the
highest and best use of the land. Depending upon the actual use of the property, Model II may
yield a land value equivalent to the land's allowable use, reasonable beneficial use, or resource
protective use. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York (Grand Central Terminal), 42
N.Y.2d at 331-35, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-77, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918-21; pt. III ifrra.
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in the method of valuation and, therefore, possibly the amount of
24
compensation.
B.

Model II: Grand Central Terminal

The New York Court of Appeals' decision in Grand Central Terminal represents a significant break with the past. Although a lengthy
rehash of Professor Costonis' analysis and Chief Judge B reitel's opinion
is unnecessary, a brief review of the decision is in order. In Grand
Central Terminal, the owner of the Terminal alleged that New York
City's landmark preservation ordinance, 2 5 which prohibited construc26
tion of an office building atop the Terminal, was unconstitutional.
The court upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power,
emphasizing the transferable development rights (TDR's), a form of
nondollar compensation, 27 granted to the owner. 28 Thus, in effect, the
court held that compensation was required even though the29ordinance
did not constitute an exercise of eminent domian power.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no taking had
occurred because the ordinance did not interfere with the profitability of
the Terminal in its present use. 30 The Court, therefore, found it unnecessary to decide whether the TDR's would have constituted just
compensation in an eminent domain proceeding. As a result, the
31
constitutionality of the TDR program was ambiguously left open.
Nevertheless, the Court suggested, as did the New York Court of
Appeals, that a different result would have been obtained if TDR's
had not been given to the Terminal's owner:
24. Disparity Issue, supra note 2, at 422-26; FairConpensation, supra note 2, at 1051-55.
But see Berger, supra note 16, at 816-23.
25. N.Y. City Admin. Code Ann. §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (Williams 1976).
26. 42 N.Y.2d at 327, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
27. The TDR program authorized the owner of the Terminal "to transfer to neighboring
properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation
as a landmark." Disparity Issue, supra note 2, at 407. For additional sources on TDR's, see id. at
407 n.13.
28. 42 N.Y.2d at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
29. See id. at 335-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
30. 98 S.CL at 2666. The dissent maintained that a taking had occurred "with little
or no offsetting benefit except for the honor of the designation." Id. at 2667 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). As a result, the dissent stated that the owner was entitled to "a full... and perfect
equivalent for the property taken," a standard which the TDR program did not meet. Id. at 2673
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,
326 (1893)).
31. Id. at 2666. Other commentators, however, believe that the Court explicitly recognized
the role and constitutional validity of TDR's, and may well have opened the door to resolving the
taking versus regulation impasse. E.g., Marcus, Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New
York, 30 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest 4 (No. 2, 1978). However the Supreme Court opinion is
construed, the underlying fact remains the same: Penn Central was given TDR's in mitigation of
any damages caused by the landmark law. The TDR program has some value and must be
considered in determining whether or not further compensation is required.
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While [the TDR's] may well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a 'taking'
had occurred, [they] nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the
law has imposed on [the landowner] and, for that reason, are to be taken into account
in considering the impact of regulation ....
. . . The restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the
general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but
afford appellants opportunities
further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper
32
but also other properties.

Grand Central Terminal, therefore, does not fall within either of the
two traditional models. 3 3 Model I does not apply because of the
compensation, albeit nondollar, given by the city; the absence of
the eminent domain power renders Model IV also inapplicable. In fact,
the court of appeals created a new model-referred to here as Model
II.
The court of appeals' reasoning is premised upon the governmental
action being a regulation rather than a taking. The important issue,
however, is not whether the activity is a regulation or a taking, but
whether full compensation should ever be given.
In Grand Central Terminal, the owner was not given compensation
based on the highest and best use of the Terminal. Chief Judge Breitel
stated that "[t]he compensation need not be the 'just' compensation
required in eminent domain, for there has been no attempt to take
property. ' 34 At least part of the justification for giving less than full
compensation in Grand Central Terminal, however, was the social
increment in value theory.3 5 This theory seeks to segregate increments
in land's value resulting from public, as opposed to private, contributions and efforts. In other words, the social increment in value theory
would exclude that portion of a property'' value that can be
traced "to
3' 6
public investment and concomitant community growth."
Although both Chief Judge Breitel and Professor Costonis suggest
that Grand Central Terminal may be of limited utility because of its
unique facts and administrative difficulties, 3 7 the opinion may open
32. 98 S. Ct. at 2666 (footnote omitted).
33. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text. The majority and dissent fall into the same
trap which this Article seeks to avoid. The majority says no taking has occurred and does not
discuss whether TDR's are just compensation. 98 S. Ct. at 2666. The dissent says that a taking has
occurred and the TDR's must measure up to a "full and perfect" equivalent. Id. at 2666-74
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Neither statement is nece.sarily true; the statements have meaning
only if the Court adhered to the traditional dichotomy. The fact that the Court found no taking
but awarded TDR's indicates an implicit approval of a middle ground.
34. 42 N.Y.2d at 335, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
35. See Disparity Issue, supra note 2, at 415-18.
36. See id. at 416. An additional argument against full compensation exists in a case
involving a landmark. A landmark confers a benefit to society as well as to the landowner.
Society should not have to compensate a landowner for the entire value of property when part of
that property "belongs" to society.
37. 42 N.Y.2d at 331, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918. The administrative difficulty
in distinguishing between public and private contributions to increments in land's value is
reflected in the subdivision exaction cases, in which an attempt has been made to distinguish
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the way for experiments by courts (but preferably by legislatures) to
redefine the compensation scheme. The Supreme Court could have
significantly advanced "taking" jurisprudence if it had directly ad-

dressed the issue of whether a middle way exists rather than forcing the case into a category in which it does not belong. Nevertheless, Grand Central Terminal may lead to the creation of a class of land
use disputes that are of an intermediate nature. The flexibility allowed
in that case, a police power case, opens the possibility for additional
flexibility in eminent domain cases, that is, awarding less than full
compensation to a condemnee.
II.

A
A.

VALUATION ALTERNATIVE

The Need for a Change

Land use decisions are becoming increasingly complex and the

economic impact of developing categories of land use issues is far from
being ascertained. For example, inclusionary zoning, landmark preservation, exclusionary zoning, impact zoning, down-zoning, amortization of nonconforming uses, resource conservation, open space pres-

ervation, comprehensive plans, and growth management all address a
range of interests much broader than the controversy of landowner
versus regulator. 38 Additionally, the effect of externalities, that is,
social cost, administrative cost, and transaction costs have, or should

have, a significant impact on policymakers. The economic and social
impact of land use decisions calls for a realignment of land use issues.
Professor Costonis has suggested that regulation issues in land use
decisions have been approached from the wrong perspective. The
writings of Sax, Michelman, and Van Alstyne, as well as those of their

opponents Ellickson and Siegan, have approached the issues from a

dichotomized viewpoint. 3 9 Costonis has proposed an accommodation to

bridge this dichotomy. A further refinement of the accommodation
argument is needed, however. The taking problem must be apbetween public and private benefit of land. Compare Associated Home Builders v.City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (197 1) and
Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41 Ill.
App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff'd, 68 I1. 2d 352,
369 N.E.2d 892 (1977) with Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 111.2d
375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961). Well-drafted standards appear to be the only sensible method of
accommodating public and private rights in land use regulation. See Divan Builders, Inc. v.
Planning Board, 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (1975); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385 (1977); Johnston, Developments in Land Use
Control, 45 Notre Dame Law. 399 (1970).
38. One approach to the urban sprawl is an attempt to bring the suburbs to the cities. See
Huxtable, Today the Cards Are All in the Builder's Hands, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26. 1978, § 2. at
29, col. 1; Machalaba, Municipal Mall: Philadelphia's'Galler,' Tests a City's Ability To Lure
Back Shoppers, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
39. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text. But see Hagman, Compensable Regulation,
in Windfalls for Wipeouts 256 (1978) (discussing a wide range of middle way theories that have
been used to justify payment to the property owner for severe restriction of land use by the
government that results in lower property value).
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proached from the perspective of valuing land. Before such an approach can be taken, however, the current principles of land valuation
must be understood.
1. The Highest and Best Use Principle
and Fair Market Value
It is pointless to rewrite the books on valuation and eminent domain
proceedings. 40 The general rule can be stated with deceptive simplicity:4 1the condemnee is entitled to the fair market value of his property. An accepted definition of fair market value, for eminent domain
purposes, is a price "agreed to by an informed seller who is willing but
not obligated to sell, and an informed buyer who is willing but not
obligated to buy."'4 2 Certain inherent attributes of this definition must
be noted: (1) it is a hypothetical transaction; (2) it is speculative; and
(3) full knowledge on the part of the buyer and seller is presumed.4 3
When such a hypothetical sale is created, the land is valued from the
buyer's viewpoint because the seller is assumed to know what the
buyer plans to do with the property. Thus, the buyer, who is in a
position to develop the property to its highest and best use, is valuing
that property according to his own desires. Likewise, the seller attempts to set the price to fit the buyer's developmental goals. In theory,
is that the property is sold for its highest
therefore, the consequence
4
and best

use.

4

It seems somewhat specious to argue that land in an undeveloped
state has inherent value apart from its ownership. Nevertheless, the
40. See generally 1 J. Bonbright, The Valuation of Property 415-17 (1937); A. Jahr, Law of
Eminent Domain Valuation and Procedure § 78 (1953); 4 Nichols' The Law of Eminent
Domain § 12.1[21 (3d ed. J. Sackman 1974); 1 L. Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of Eminent
Domain §§ 28-31 (2d ed. 1953). See also S. Searles, A Practical Guide to the Legal and Appraisal
Aspects of Condemnation (1969); S. Searles, Real Estate Valuation in Condemnation (1970);
Bigham, "FairMarket Value," "Just Compensation," and the Constitution:A Critical View, 24
Vand. L. Rev. 63 (1970); Hershman, Compensation-Justand Unjust, 21 Bus. Law. 285 (1966).
41. A. Jahr, supra note 40, § 70; 4 Nichols', supra note 40, § 12.2. Each of the words
--"fair," "market," and "value"--is laden with ambiguities that have befuddled scholars
and courts and will certainly continue to do so for some time. What is fair? The answer to that
question will be left to Professors Ackerman and Michelman. See note 1 supra. What is the
market? For real property, it is not inconceivable to say that there is no such thing as a market,
as it is well recognized that for condemnation purpose; a hypothetical situation is created, See
notes 42-43 infra and accompanying text. See also I J. Bonbright, supra note 40, at 413-19; A.
Jahr, supra note 40, § 78; 1 L. Orgel, supra note 40, §§ 28-31.
42. Uniform Eminent Domain Act § 1004(a). For variations of the willing buyer/willing seller
concept as the basis of ascertaining fair market value, see 1 L. Orgel, supra note 40, § 20.
43. See 1 J. Bonbright, supra note 40, at 414-15; C. McCormick, Damages § 129 (1935); 1 L.
Orgel, supra note 40, §§ 15, 28-30; Hershman, supra note 40, at 304-05.
44. See, e.g., Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. § 12-105(b) (1974); 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1-603
(Purdon Supp. 1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 32.09(2), (8)(a) (West 1973); Fair Compensation, supra
note 2, at 1039-45; Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1429, 1498 (1978);
Lewin, 50,000 Cases in a Swamp, Nat'l Law J., Nov. 6, 1978, at 10, col. 4.
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fair market value of the land in eminent domain cases has been defined
in those terms. 45 Why must the landowner be given something more
than that which he actually holds? Preliminary research has revealed
no affirmative justification for the principle. One commentator has
indicated that under Roman law the highest and best use principle was
not the only basis of valuation, 46 and that there was no real develop47
ment of valuation law in early common law cases.
Regardless of which theory of economic development one follows, 48

until recently, land has been regarded as the basis of wealth; moreover, the production and development of land, or, more accurately,
the exploitation of our nation's resources, has been the espoused policy
on which land use law rests. 49 It is not unusual that courts have
valued land according to a highest and best use principle, and thereby
have provided a profit incentive that encouraged land development.
Today, however, environmental regulations seek to conserve our finite
resources, 50 and it seems only fitting that the courts reflect this policy
in the area of eminent domain as well.5 1 The current trend toward
slowing development,5 2 or at least not encouraging it, 3 can be im45. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
46. See Matthews, The Valuation of Property in the Roman Law, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 229,
238-49 (1921).
47. See generally Matthews, The Valuation of Property in the Early Common Law, 35 Harv.
L. Rev. 15 (1921). See also J. Nowak, supra note 1, at 438-40; 4 Nichols', supra note 40,
§ 12.1[2].
48. Compare F. Turner, The Frontier in American History (1920) with C. Beard, An
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913).
49. See L. Friedman, A History of American Law 179-201 (1972).
50. See, e.g., F. Bosselman, D. Feurer & T. Richter, Federal Land Use Regulation 9-57
(1977); W. Rodgers, Handbook on Environmental Law §§ 7.1-.12, at 697-834 (1977).
51. See Yannacone, Property and Stewardship-Private Property Plus Public Interest
Equals Social Property, 23 S.D. L. Rev. 71, 117-39 (1978). The authorities cited herein recognize
the extent of the limitations on one's use of land. No one, including the market theorists, believes
in an unfettered right to absolute development. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 14, at 416-18;
Lefcoe, The Right to Develop Land: The German and Dutch Experience, 56 Or. L. Rev. 31
(1977). The heart of the common law's land use control is the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (use your property in such a manner as not to injure that of another). See also W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts §§ 86-91, at 571-612 (4th ed. 1971).
52. The extent to which municipalities can regulate growth and the extent to which courts
will permit development is of vital concern both economically and socially. The proposals herein
may play a significant part in an overall growth management scheme. See, e.g., ABA Advisory
Commission on Housing & Urban Growth, Housing for All Under Law, ch. 1 (1978); 3 N,
Villiams, American Land Planning Law, ch. 66 (1975 & Supp. 1978); Ellickson, supra note 14, at
385-511; Wright, ConstitutionalRights and Land Use Planning: The New and The Old Reality
1977 Duke L.J. 841, 841-68.
53. This trend, however, does not preclude or discourage development. The developer who
buys swamp land takes the risk that he will be able to develop that land. Part of this risk is that the
government may restrict development or perhaps even take the land. These risks, however, can
be provided for contractually by having the developer enter into an option contract or by making
the contract contingent upon the developer obtaining a building permit or upon the vesting of the
right to develop. See D. Hagman, supra note 1, §§ 99-100. In those instances when developers do
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plemented by abandoning the highest and best use principle and
adopting the valuation principle set forth in Part II(B).
2.

The Highest and Best Use Principle Illustrated

In addition to the policy considerations discussed above, the highest
and best use principle often leads to questionable results. The problems can be traced to a weakness in the hypothetical transaction used
to define fair market value. 54 Landowners frequently sell because of
an inability, financial or otherwise, to develop their land profitably. As
a result, sellers are frequently compensated for the value of the highest
and best use of their land, when, in fact, they had neither the intention
nor the ability to develop the land to its highest and best use.
The facts surrounding the development of Columbia, Maryland will
be used to demonstrate the inherent unfairness of valuating land
according to the highest and best use principle. 5 5 The first step in the
development was to assemble a, tract of land suitable for a city of
mixed uses with a population of 100,000. The developer, James Rouse,
planned to buy land at an average price of $1,500 per acre, starting at
$1,000 and rising to a maximum of $3,000 as the project neared
completion. The last and most important parcel to be acquired, which
was to contain the town center, a symphony hall, and a shopping
center, consisted of 1,000 acres and belonged to "Big Bear" Isidore
Gudelsky. Rouse was willing to offer Gudelsky significantly more than
$1,000 because of the importance of the parcel. If Gudelsky had not
been informed about Rouse's plans for the tract, he might have sold for
$1,000 per acre, the value of the tract to him. Because Gudelsky was
informed, however, he and Rouse agreed on a purchase price of
$3,000,000 or $3,000 per acre.
Assume that the day before the deal was closed, the state condemned the parcel to construct a highway. Since the value of the land
to Gudelsky was $1,000 per acre, it would seem logical that he would
be compensated for that value. Condemnee Gudelsky, however, would
be entitled to compensation for his land according to its highest and
best use which is determined according to the land's fair market value.
Since the fair market value is based upon a price agreed to by a willing
buyer and a willing seller, in this case $3,000 per acre, 5 6 it would seem
that Gudelsky would be justly compensated with an award of $3,000
per acre. Nevertheless, after examining the highest and best use
principle, Gudelsky's attorneys could successfully argue that the tract
not make such contractual provisions, or when those contractual provisions prove to be
inadequate, the doctrines of mutual mistake, unilatera., mistake, frustration of purpose, and
impossibility of performance can be relied upon.
54. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
55. See generally G. Breckenfeld, Columbia and the New Cities, ch. 10 (1971).
56. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
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as a key to a multimillion dollar deal must be valued as such.
Therefore, Gudelsky would be compensated in excess of $3,000 per
acre.
If, however, the state condemned the parcel the day after the deal
was closed, condemnee Rouse would also be compensated according to
the highest and best use principle. Rouse could argue that the $3,000
per acre figure is only the price at which Gudelsky sold, not the value
of the land's highest and best use, that is, as the key to a multimillion
dollar deal. Thus, Rouse would also be awarded much more than
$3,000 per acre.
From this example, it is easy to see the illogical results produced by
utilizing a highest and best use principle of valuation. The value of the
tract to Gudelsky was $1,000. He sold the tract for $3,000. Yet,
although he was unable and had no intention of developing his tract,
he would receive in excess of $3,000 per acre, the value of the land to
Rouse. Although Rouse also receives somewhat of a windfall, his
seems less disturbing because he, in fact, had the ability and intent to
develop the land. Considering the inconsistencies produced in using
the highest and best use principle, an alternative is needed.
B.

The Status of the Owner Standard

The weakness of the hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller
theory is that it attempts to determine the value of the property
through the guise of the fully informed and willing buyer figure. If the
constitutional mandate is to compensate owners of property, 7 then the
value of property should be based upon its value in its owner's hands. In
lieu of the highest and best use principle, which emphasizes the
particular physical characteristics, topography, and demography of the
land, it is submitted that the status of the owner should be the focus of
a land valuation. It is not suggested that these traditional factors be
ignored, but rather that the status of the owner be the primary factor
considered. Support for this proposal can be found in the New York
Court of Appeals' decision in Grand Central Terminal. Chief Judge
Breitel examined the history and ownership of the Terminal, and the
potential for development of surrounding parcels, in addition to considering the topographic and demographic characteristics of the Terminal.5 8 Only then was it determined that the land on which the
Terminal was located had public and private value wholly apart from
its physical characteristics. 5 9
57. See U.S. Const. amends. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.'), XIV, § 1 ("[Nqor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
58. 42 N.Y.2d at 331-32, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918-19.
59. The Grand Central Terminal decision goes further and separates the public (social and
governmental) value from the private value. Id. at 332-33, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
919.
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The proposed valuation alternative should be distinguished from a

pure value to the owner standard under which property is valued
considering attributes peculiarly valuable to the landowner. 60 A landowner should not be permitted to argue, for example, that the condemned land has been in his family for five generations and therefore
has acquired a unique value to him which is deserving of compensa61
tion.

If the status to the owner standard were applied to the RouseGudelsky hypothetical, a result more sensible than that obtained under
the highest and best use principle would occur. If Gudelsky were
farming the land, he would receive the value of the land as farm land.
On the other hand, if Gudelsky recently purchased the land planning
to develop it, the land would be valued by its planned purpose.
Gudelsky's plans for the land are a question of fact. Gudelsky may
claim that he plans to develop the property as a space center. If that
use of the land is unrealistic in Gudelsky's hands, that use should not
be used to gauge its market value. If, however, Gudelsky claims that
he plans to develop the land as a residential subdivision, and he can
prove that he hired an architect and engineer, and submitted plans for
approval, it would seem that he did intend to develop a residential
subdivision. The land, therefore, should be valued according to its
planned purpose.
Although valuing property based upon either its actual use or
according to the status of the property holder is not a novel idea, 62
their joint application is. Courts appear to have adopted a value to the
owner standard by espousing a policy of indemnification. 63 The courts
have said that just compensation is intended to put the property owner
in as good a financial position as he would have been in, but for the
condemnation; the economic impact of condemnation is to be borne by
the public, rather than the individual landowner. In actuality, however, the courts have not provided complete indemnification. Owners
have not received compensation for numerous incidental and consequential damages such as loss of business, loss of future profits,
business interruption, relocation cost, appraisals,
surveys, attorneys'
64
fees, and loss of goodwill of a going concern.
A status to the owner standard can replace the highest and best use

60.

A. Jahr, supra note 40, § 69; 4 Nichols', supra note 40, § 12.22; 1 L. Orgel, supra note 40,

§§ 14, 37-46, 66-80; Bigham, supra note 40, at 68-70; Hershman, supra note 40, at 301-02.
61. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. .341 (1925).
62. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1231(a), 2032A.
63. For a statement of the indemnification principle, see United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369
(1943) and cases cited note 4 supra.
64. See, e.g., S. Searles, Just Compensation: The Law, in a Practical Guide to the Legal and
Appraisal Aspects of Condemnation 187 (1969); Bigham, supra note 40, at 63-70.
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principle in all applications of the just compensation clause, or can be
selectively used in certain types of governmental takings. 6 For exam-

ple, if a government takes land for a toll road that essentially will pay
for itself, and the landowner is compensated according to the highest
and best use principle, the cost of the compensation will be spread
among all those who use the road, rather than among the local
taxpayers. Thus, although the seller may get a windfall, the taxpayers
are not treated unfairly. On the other hand, when the government
takes land for uses which are not income-producing, for example, for
social benefit such as landmarks, historic sites, and 66parks, use of the
status to the owner standard is more appropriate.

I.

REFINING COSTONIS' ACCOMMODATION ARGUMENT

The consistency between Costonis' accommodation argument and the
status of the owner standard can be illustrated by superimposing the
67
Rouse-Gudelsky tract on Costonis' "Spectrum of Land Use Intensity"
68
and on the Valuation Continuum.

ROUSE-GUDELSKY TRAcT: COSTONIS' SPECTRUM OF LAND USE INTENSITY

u

-

Intensity Index

Use

Value Per Acre

Highest and Best Use
Unrestricted by
Public Regulation

High Density City

$5,000

Allowable Use

New City

$4,000

Reasonable Beneficial
Use (RBU)

Residential

Resource Protective Use

Farm

$1,000

Zero Intensity

None

-0- or Negative

65. There is a trend in land use legislation to single out "areas of critical state concern," "key
facilities," or ecologically sensitive areas for different treatment. See ALI Model Land Development Code § 7-201 (1975); Comment, State Land Use Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 45
Fordham L. Rev. 1154, 1154-55 (1977).
66. It has been suggested by Professor Sax that a difference exists when the government is
engaging in a proprietary function, that is, an income producing activity, as opposed to when the
government is engaged in an enterprise function. In the case of a proprietary function, Sax would
apparently apply the highest and best use principle. See Sax I, supra note 1, at 61-76; Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L.
Rev. 471 (1970). But see Sax II, supra note 1, at 177-86.
67. Fair Compensation, supra note 2, at 1050.
68. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
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The value and use figures are arbitrary and are intended to be
illustrative only. It is assumed that a totally unrestricted tract can yield
a greater return than the $3,000 per acre purchase price-hence the
$5,000 figure. Development as a city must yield more than the $3,000
per acre price, otherwise Rouse would have little incentive to buy the
tract-hence the $4,000 figure. The reasonable beneficial use (RBU)
category represents the dividing line between the police power and
Costonis' accommodation power. As long as a regulation permits the
owner a reasonable economic return, or what Costonis terms a reasonable beneficial use, no compensation is required. 69 The RBU category
has been assigned a value of $3,000, the contract price between Rouse
and Gudelsky. Finally, the $1,000 figure is the value of the land to
Gudelsky, as a farm, before Rouse's plans for development.
On the Valuation Continuum, the land's value is based upon ownership.
ROUSE-GUDELSKY TRACT WITH ROUSE AS CONDEMNEE: VALUATION CONTINUUM

Use Restriction

Value to Rouse

Compensation

Model

Unrestricted

$5,000

-0-

Limited to City

$4,000

-0-

Limited to RBU
(Residential)

$3,000

-0-

Limited to Farm

$1,000

$3,000

III

$5,000

IV

Limited to Zero

Intensity

-0-

1

The Valuation Continuum mode of analysis yields significant disparities in treatment. If the property is unrestricted, that is, subject to
no ordinance or statute restricting the use of the land, no compensation
is due. This case does not fall under any of the four models. Model I is
an exercise of the police power; the restriclion may make the property
less valuable than unrestricted property, but no compensation is
required. Under Model IV, the traditional taking model, Rouse would
be awarded $5,000 compensation, because Model IV requires valuation according to the highest and best use principle. The difference in
compensation required under Model I and Model IV is the disparity
issue of which Costonis speaks.
Model II is Costonis' accommodation model, under which an exercise
of police power requires some compensation. If the exercise of the
69. FairCompensation, supra note 2, at 1051. See generally Disparity Issue, supra note 2, at
422-26. Professor Berger has suggested that Costonis' reasonable beneficial use category puts old
wine in new bottles. See Berger, supra note 16, at 816-17.
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police power results in a value less than RBU, Costonis requires
compensation up to the amount of RBU. 7 0 Costonis' RBU analysis,
however, necessitates categorizing uses into either exercises of eminent
domain or police power. Because the point at which a regulation
becomes a taking cannot easily be defined, 7 ' RBU analysis merely
adds to the confusion of existing eminent domain-police power law. An
accommodation model should be broad enough to include certain
governmental actions, whether exercises of eminent domain or police
power, for which less than full compensation will be given.
Model mI- illustrates a governmental taking for which some, but less
than full, compensation is awarded the landowner, based upon the
actual use, rather than the highest and best use of the land. Thus, if the
tract is restricted and that restriction brings the value of the property
below its RBU value, the owner would be compensated for the
difference in value as restricted and the value of its intended purpose.
In the example, the Gudelsky tract, if restricted to farm land, has a
reduced value of $1,000 per acre. Thus, $3,000 per acre compensation
is required under Model III to give Rouse the value of the land to him,
that is, $4,000 per acre. This is more than the $2,000 Costonis would
give, that is, the $3,000 RBU value minus the $1,000 value as farm
land, but less than the highest and best use value of $5,000. It is
submitted that the $3,000 is a fair return because Rouse bought the
property with an ability and intent to develop; the compensation is
based upon the land's value to him.
The value of the property, as well as the compensation required,
changes when Gudelsky is condemnee.

ROUSE-GUDELSKY TRAcT WITH GDELSKY AS CONDEMNEE: VALUATION CONTINxUI

Use Restriction

Value to Gudelsky

Compensation

Unrestricted

S1,000

-0-

Limited to City

$1,000

-0-

Limited to RBU

$1,000

.0.

(Residential)

Model

I
___000-0-_I

Limited to Farm

$1,000

-0-

Limited to Zero

-0-

$5,000

II

IV

Intensity

Gudelsky could not demand compensation until a land use restriction
devalued the land below its value to him, that is, $1,000 per acre. If a
70.
71.

Disparity Issue, supra note 2, at 411-12; Fair Compensation, supra note 2, at 1051-55.
Fair Compensation, supra note 2, at 1034-37.
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regulation limited his land to a use less profitable than farming, 72
Gudelsky could demand compensation based upon the difference in
value of the land restricted and as farm land. Gudelsky's compensation, however, would be based upon the $1,000 figure, not the $3,000
RBU figure, nor the $4,000 figure applicable to Rouse. Thus, Gudelsky's compensation would be $1,000 per acre or less under Model III,
which should be compared to the case of a taking under Model IV for
which Gudelsky would receive a $5,000 award.
CONCLUSION

This Article is a preliminary inquiry. It raises more questions than it
purports to answer. Further analysis is needed to determine Model
lII's economic consequences, ethical foundation, administrative problems, and proper application. The proposal could also73create problems in
the area of judicial review and equal protection.
Nevertheless, replacing the highest and best use principle with a
status of the owner standard is a step in the right direction. Because
compensation under Model III would be less, in most cases, than
under Model IV, government money may be freed to be used for open
spaces, parks, and other benefits to society which are presently desirable but unaffordable. Additionally, elimination of the highest and best
use principle may discourage inefficient development which may, in
turn, conserve our natural resources.
An accommodation model is not a panacea for the difficult and elusive
problem of drawing a line between a regulation and a taking, but it is
a palliative. The trend toward limiting development and conserving
resources, coupled with the expanded use of the police power for open
space, environmental, and ecological purposes, call for an accommodation model that values land according to the status of the owner.
Models II and III are the Hobbits of the middle way; they have always
lived there but we folk were unaware of them for many long years.
72. Examples of less intensive development than agiculture are open space, see, e.g., State
Dep't of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977), and
aquaculture. See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
73. The different treatment accorded the two parties in the Rouse-Gudelsky hypothetical
under the status of the owner standard should not present an equal protection problem because
the parties are not similarly situated. Additionally, equal protection rights are personal and are
not applicable to the different treatment of the same property. See, e.g., L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 16-1, at 991-94 (1978).
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